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There is no shortage of studies regarding price forecasting and marketing strategies of 
producers.  However, the majority of these studies take a normative approach, focusing on 
deriving an optimal strategy for producers to follow based on information received from 
producer surveys.  Due to such things as psychological biases, producers may not actually use 
the marketing information that they say they do.  This study uses actual producer transaction 
data to determine how producers marketing decisions correspond with those recommended by 
market advisory services and with those that use futures spreads to calculate expected returns.  
The results show that producers do respond to using futures spreads to represent expected 
returns to storage.  Also, it appears that Oklahoma producers make marketing decisions 
opposite of those recommended by market advisory services. 
 




Agricultural economists have supplied the agricultural industry with many studies regarding the 
price forecasting and marketing strategies of producers.  Nearly all of these studies take a 
normative approach to the topic and attempt to derive an “optimal” marketing strategy for 
producers to follow.  However, recent studies indicate that producers seldom follow the price 
forecasting and marketing strategy recommendations suggested by agricultural economists 
(Brorsen and Irwin; Musser, Patrick, and Eckman; McNew and Musser).  Producers tend to 
avoid the complex pricing models that researchers provide and prefer more simplistic forecasting 
methods (Anderson and Mapp).  This lack of use by producers suggests that the price forecasting 
and marketing strategy information being supplied to producers is not reflective of their actual 
marketing decisions. 
 
In order to provide producers with more relevant marketing information, we must ask what 
sources of marketing strategy information actually influence the producers’ marketing decisions?  
The majority of research on the market information used by producers focuses on results from 
producer surveys (Patrick and Ullerich; Batte, Schnitkey, and Jones; Ortmann et al.).  These 
surveys indicate that producers consider private consultants, such as market advisory services
†, a 
highly important source of marketing information.  For example, Patrick and Ullerich’s study of 
17 marketing information sources reported that market advisory services were outranked only by 
past farm records.  In a study by Schroeder et al. a sample of Kansas farmers rank market 
advisory services as the number one source of information for developing price expectations.  
 
                                                 
* The authors would like to thank Scott H. Irwin for the market advisory data used in this research and for the 
helpful literature suggestions. 
† For a subscription fee advisory services help farmers with their marketing decisions by providing marketing 
information, analysis and recommendations.  See Isengildina et al. for a complete review of the market advisory 
service industry.   
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While these surveys reveal the information sources producers say they use, there is limited 
empirical research on whether producers actually follow market advisory service 
recommendations in their marketing decisions.  Survey responses by Pennings, Irwin, and Good 
and Isengildina et al. suggest few producers closely follow the specific pricing recommendations 
of market advisory services.  Instead, producers generally use market advisory services for 
background information, comparing it with other information sources in order to make a decision 
(Pennings, Irwin, and Good; Isengildina et al.).  One reason that producers do not closely follow 
these recommendations may be the low pricing performance shown by market advisory services.  
The average revenue achieved by following market advisory service recommendations for corn 
and soybeans is only slightly above the benchmark average (Irwin, Martines-Filho, and Good), 
while the average revenue achieved for wheat is well below the benchmark average (Martines-
Filho, Good, and Irwin).           
 
Other price forecasting and marketing strategies research has found that using marketing 
strategies based on market-generated forecasts of productions profits are the best bet for 
producers.  Zulauf and Irwin suggested using the local cash price basis (futures-cash) as a 
marketing signal and found that storing when the basis is larger than storage costs can be a 
favorable marketing strategy, given that a short futures hedge is placed at harvest.  Additional 
research on the accuracy of price forecasting models reveals that forecasts based on econometric 
models generally do no better than forecasts based on futures markets (Tomek) and may even be 
outperformed by futures markets for certain commodities (Kastens and Schroeder).                      
 
Matwichuk found a positive relationship between the market sentiment of market advisory 
services and past commodity returns, suggesting that market advisory services are trend 
followers.  Trend followers make marketing decisions based on technical rather than 
fundamental information (Sanders et al.).  The question now is, “Do producers prefer marketing 
strategies based on mainly technical information, such as market advisory service 
recommendations, or do they prefer more fundamental strategies, such as changes in expected 
returns to storage?”  Thus, the objective of this research is to determine how wheat producers’ 
selling decisions correspond with market advisory service recommendations and changes in 
expected returns.  In order to satisfy this objective, a Tobit regression model will be used to 
evaluate the effect of market advisory service recommendations and futures price spreads on the 
number of wheat sales that occur on a given day for a sample of Oklahoma wheat producers.     
 
The majority of past research on producer marketing information consists of producer surveys 
that report which information sources producers say they use.  However, it is possible that 
producers do not act in the way that they say they act.  Studies on behavioral finance find that 
people are prone to psychological biases when making marketing decisions (Brorsen and 
Anderson, 2001; Kahneman and Riepe).  Examples of psychological biases include 
overconfidence in one’s ability to predict the market and the tendency to remember successes 
and forget failures, known as hindsight bias.  Individuals typically are not aware that they have 
these biases.  Thus, research based on producer surveys may not accurately reflect the marketing 
strategy needs of producers.  This study goes beyond producer surveys by using actual producer 
transactions to obtain a more precise idea of the type of information producers are using to make 
their marketing decisions.       
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Theory            
 
There is no shortage of literature regarding the price of storage and the optimal marketing 
strategy that crop producers should follow (e.g. Working; Williams and Wright; Fackler and 
Livingston; Zulauf and Irwin).  The theory of the price of storage explains inter-temporal price 
relationships between spot and futures with regards to the cost of carrying a particular 
commodity.  It takes into account the interest foregone in storing a commodity (opportunity cost 
of storage), the physical cost of storage (including a risk premium), and the convenience yield 
for holding stocks (Working; Fama and French; Yoon and Brorsen).  Thus, the price of storage, 
or the basis, is defined as:  
(1)                                              T t T t T t t t T t C W R S S F , , , , − + = −  
where Ft,T is the futures price at time t for delivery of a commodity at time T, St is the spot price 
at time t, Rt,T is the interest foregone during storage (opportunity cost), Wt,T is the marginal 
physical cost of storage (e.g. storage rent, handling costs, insurance, transport, etc.), and Ct,T is 
the marginal convenience yield.  The price of storage,  t T t S F − , , can also be interpreted as the 
return from purchasing the commodity at t and selling it for delivery at T; this is the return to 
storage from time period t to T (t < T ).   
The convenience yield, as defined by Working, refers to the implicit benefits that accrue to the 
owner of a physical stock but not to the owner of a contract for future delivery.  For example, a 
convenience yield may exist from holding stores of some commodities, such as wheat, because 
they are inputs in the production of other commodities, such as flour.  Stockholders may also 
earn a convenience yield by being able to respond efficiently to unexpected changes in supply 
and demand.  The theory of storage predicts an inverse relationship between convenience yields 
and inventories (Fama and French); therefore, the benefits are greater when inventories are 
small.    
The basic farmer marketing strategy is to continue to store as long as the expected marginal 
returns from storage are greater than the expected marginal costs of storage, defined as:     
(2)                                              ) ( ) ( , , , T t T t t t t T t t W R S E S F E + > −  
where the expected marginal returns to storage in time t are represented by the basis,  t T t S F − , , 
and the expected marginal cost of storage at time t are the sum of interest foregone (opportunity 
costs) and the physical costs of storage (rent, handling charges, insurance, transport).  Returns to 
storage are not the only factor in the producer’s marketing strategy.  Government programs and 
producers’ individual cash flows and taxes could also play a role.  For example, if a producer’s 
storage cost is low government loan programs may encourage continued storage by allowing the 
producer to retain the real option value implicit in a loan program (Yoon and Brorsen).  
Producers may time their selling decisions with their need for cash inflows to make loan 
payments or cover production expenses.  They might also hold off selling until after the first of 
the year in order to reduce their income tax.     
Fackler and Livingston argue that this basic strategy is too simplistic for crop producers because 
it assumes that stocks can easily be replenished during the marketing year.  Due to the fact that a  
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sale out of storage is an irreversible action for a crop producer, they propose a marketing strategy 
that still involves storing at low prices and selling at high prices but with a cutoff price function 
marking the boundary between low and high prices.  Thus, producers would sell if the current 
expected returns to storage exceed the maximum expected future returns to storage, 
(3)              ] ) [( max ] ) [( , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , T t T t T t T t T t t t t t t t t W R S S F E W R S S F E + + + + + + − − > + − −  
where ] ) [( t t t t t t W R S S F E + − −  is the expected net returns from selling at the present time t and 
] ) [( max , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 T t T t T t T t T t t W R S S F E + + + + + + − −  are the maximum future returns to storage expected 
at any future date.  Zulauf and Irwin propose a marketing strategy that more resembles the basic 
strategy.  They found that the most successful strategies were those that used the futures market 
as a source of information.  The marketing strategy they suggest is to base storage decisions on 
whether the current futures-cash basis (return to storage) exceeds the cost of storing and use 
hedging to increase the chances of acquiring the expected return.  In the current study few 
producers likely use hedging in their marketing decisions.  Considering that hedging only 
increased the statistical power of Zulauf and Irwin’s tests, rather than increased the expected 
returns, their arguments still apply even though producers were not using futures.   
An important element of equations (2) and (3) is that producers must form expectations about the 
returns to storage.  Agricultural economists typically assume that producers form rational 
expectations.  This assumption implies that producers use all available market information to 
make rational decisions.  Producers may use fundamental information, such as changes in futures 
prices, or technical information, such as price trends, to make their marketing decisions.  
Research indicates that technical analysis, in the form of trend following, can be profitable, 
though usually in relatively small amounts (Covel; Lukac and Brorsen).  Market advisory 
services and sentiment indices have been found to follow price trends in the manner of positive 
feedback traders, meaning that they recommend holding when prices increase (Matwichuk, 
Sanders et al.).  Producers, on the other hand, are typically thought to be negative feedback 
traders, selling after prices increase (Brorsen and Anderson, 2002; Sanders et al.).  Aside from 
fundamental and technical strategies, producers could base their marketing decisions on non-
information, known as noise trading (Black), or they could use mechanical marketing strategies 
that involve selling at the same time every year regardless of the market (i.e. selling at harvest).  
The point is that in order to better understand producers’ marketing strategies we must first 




Data are from three grain elevators located in the northern, southern, and central areas of western 
Oklahoma.  The data span nine crop years, from the harvest of 1992 through the harvest of 2000, 
and contain individual producer transactions of wheat sales at each elevator.  Information about 
each sale includes the number of bushels sold, price per bushel, and date of transaction.  Sales 
decrease as the number of weeks after harvest increase.  We attempt to measure this deviation 
around annual seasonal patterns of sales by including the number of weeks after harvest that the 
sale occurred.  Harvest is a four-week period that differs for each elevator depending on location.  
Beginning harvest dates for the southern, central, and northern elevators are May 25, June 1, and 
June 12 respectively.    
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Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for each elevator.  The southern elevator has the 
highest price, lowest average number of weeks, and the highest percentage of harvest sales.  
According to Benirschka and Binkley, locations closer to the market (the Gulf) typically have 
higher negative returns to storage than locations further away from the market.  Therefore, 
southern producers are more likely to sell at or close to harvest which results in a lower average 
number of weeks after harvest compared to the central and northern elevators.  The higher 
average price at the southern elevator is likely due to the fact that the southern elevator is closer 
to the market (the Gulf), and thus transportation costs are lower.  Therefore, the average price is 
higher at the southern elevator.  Another reason for the higher average price could be that harvest 
is slightly earlier at the southern elevator providing the potential to sell wheat before prices reach 
harvest lows.     
  
In addition to the elevator data, wheat market advisory service recommendations were obtained 
from the Agricultural Market Advisory Service (AgMAS) Project at the University of Illinois.  
The data contain daily selling recommendations from 34 market advisory services.  Each 
recommendation consists of the percentage of stored crop to be sold on a given day in a given 
year, spanning the crop years of 1995-1999.  Market advisory services offer “blanket” 
recommendations to farmers, meaning that the selling recommendation for a given day is 
typically not reflective of individual producer location.  Producers in Oklahoma receive the same 
recommendation as producers in Illinois.  For the purpose of this study we will use the average 
daily sales recommendations for the 34 advisory services.  Since the market advisory service 
sales recommendations are represented as a cumulative percentage, the difference between the 
previous day and the following day was calculated, giving us daily recommended sales.  This is 
the value that is used to represent market advisory service recommendations in the estimation 
process.  Due to elevator data constraints, the study does not consider pre-harvest sales 
recommendations which may account for as much as 50% of the market advisory service 
recommendations.   
  
Futures spreads are used to represent the expected returns to storage and are calculated based on 
Kansas City futures prices.  Wheat futures contracts are sold in March, May, July, September, 
and December.  Oklahoma producers do not typically store their wheat for long periods of time, 
therefore, only the nearby and distant futures price spreads are used.  The nearby spread is the 
futures spread that is nearest to the date of the given transactions, and the distant spread is the 
futures spread that is second nearest to the given transaction date.  For example, the nearby 
spread for a transaction with a date of May 5 for a given year would be the difference between 
the September 5
th futures price and the July 5
th futures price for the given year.  The distant 
spread for the same transaction would be the difference between the December 5
th futures price 
and the September 5
th futures price for the given year.  Due to the fact that futures contracts are 
bought and sold only during certain months, a cutoff date to distinguish between the selling and 
delivery timeframe for those months had to be established.  The cutoff date was set at the 20
th of 
the month prior to each contract month (March, May, July, September, and December).  Since all 
the spreads do not cover the same number of months, they were divided by the number of days in 
each price spread.  For example, the May-July spread contains two months and the December-
March spread consists of three months, so the price spreads were divided by the number of days 
in each spread, 61 and 90, respectively (ignoring leap years).             
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Before using the data certain modifications had to be performed.  First, the 1998 crop year is not 
included in the data at the northern elevator due to missing producer transaction information.  
Secondly, the last two weeks in May for every year were deleted from the dataset for the 
southern elevator and the first two weeks in June for every year were deleted from the dataset for 
the northern elevator.  This is due to the fact that the market advisory service data always 
assumed that the crop year began on June 1 and ended on May 31 of the following year.  While 
the harvest date at the central elevator coincides with this assumption, the southern elevator’s 
harvest is earlier in the season and the northern elevator’s harvest is later in the season.  
Therefore, in order for the market advisory service recommendations to correctly correspond 





The following regression model is estimated for each elevator to determine how producers’ 
selling decisions correspond with market advisory service recommendations and expected 
returns to storage: 
 
(4)       ikt ikt ikt
y







, 1 , 4 3 2 1 0  
 
where wsikt is the number of wheat sales that occurred at the i
th elevator on the k
th day in year t, 
cyt is a yearly dummy variable to adjust for differences in price across years, nearikt is the nearby 
futures spread, distikt is the distant futures spread, masi,k-1,t is the lagged average percent of the 
crop that market advisory services recommended selling on that date
‡, wahikt is the number of 
weeks after harvest that the transaction occurred, 
2
ikt wah  is the non-linear term for number of 
weeks after harvest, and  ikt ε  is the error term such that  ) , 0 ( ~
2
it it N σ ε .  The error term is 
expected to be heteroskedastic with the following variance equation: 
  




ikt ikt ikt wah wah α α α σ + + = . 
 
Due to the fact that the dependent variable can take on a value of zero when no transactions 
occur, a Tobit regression will be used to estimate the truncated model.  Therefore, it allows the 
dependent variable to reflect when no sales take place.  The Tobit regression procedure assumes 
normality which is not the case in our model.  A square root transformation on the dependent 
variable was done to induce normality.  The square root transformation is the standard 
transformation used with count data.  The model will be tested for heteroskedasticity and 
estimated using maximum likelihood.  
 
                                                 
‡ A non-lagged market advisory service variable was considered, but was not found to be significant.  Examination 
of the cross-correlation between the residuals of the dependent variable and the market advisory service variable led 
to the conclusion that the variable should be lagged by one day.  This seems reasonable since it could take a day for 
farmers to receive the information.    
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Typically, producers will continue to store as long as expected returns to storage are greater than 
expected costs of storage.  As the returns to storage increase, producers are expected to continue 
storing and fewer wheat sales will take place.  Thus,  2 β  and  3 β are expected to be negative.  
Since producer surveys indicate that a large number of producers report using market advisory 
service recommendations, the number of wheat sales is expected to increase with the market 
advisory services’ daily selling recommendations, so  4 β is expected to be positive.  As 
mentioned before, Oklahoma wheat producers typically sell the majority of their crop at or close 
to harvest.  Therefore, as weeks after harvest increase we expect to observe fewer transactions 




Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the results of the Tobit regression of expected returns to storage (futures 
price spreads) and market advisory service recommendations on number of wheat sales at the 
northern, central and southern elevators.  As expected the variables representing the nearby and 
distant futures price spreads exhibited a negative relationship with the number of wheat sales at 
all three locations.  Thus, when spreads are high producers are less likely to sell and more 
inclined to continue to store their wheat.  The nearby spreads were found to be significant at the 
95% confidence level for all three elevators, while the distant futures spread was only significant 
at the northern and central elevators.  Since the southern elevator is one of the first to harvest 
wheat, most southern producers sell immediately before prices reach harvest lows.   Also, the 
returns to storage tend to increase as location moves further away from the market (Benirschka 
and Binkley). Therefore, more long-term storage is expected to occur at the central and northern 
elevators and could explain why the distant futures spread increases in significance as elevator 
location moves northward.  These results indicate that producers are using futures price spreads 
as part of their selling decision.  This is consistent with a marketing strategy that uses 
fundamental analysis, such as using futures spreads to calculate expected returns to storage, and 
suggests that producers may, at least partly, base price expectations and storage decisions on 
fundamental information.            
  
The regression further indicated that the market advisory service recommendation variable did 
not have the expected positive sign across all elevators.  The sign was only positive at the central 
elevator.  However, it was not statistically significant, signifying that market advisory service 
recommendations have no affect on producers’ selling decisions at the central elevator. Market 
advisory service recommendations exhibited an inverse relationship at the southern and northern 
elevators where it was significant at the 95% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively.  These 
results suggest that producers are not following the recommendations of market advisory 
services.  Instead, they are doing the opposite of what the advisory services recommend.  Market 
advisory services have been found to be positive feedback traders, holding when prices rise and 
selling when prices fall (Matwichuk; Sanders et al.), while producers have been found to be 
negative feedback traders, holding when prices fall and selling when prices rise (Brorsen and 
Anderson, 2002).  Thus, producers are likely unknowingly making marketing decisions in 
opposite directions of market advisory service recommendations.  This negative relationship 
indicates that producers do not directly implement strategies based on technical information into 
their marketing decisions.    
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The variables measuring number of weeks after harvest are statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level and exhibit the expected signs across all three elevators indicating that as the 
number of weeks after harvest increase fewer wheat sales take place.  This is consistent with the 
theory that Oklahoma wheat producers typically sell the majority of their crop at or close to 




This paper determined whether Oklahoma wheat producers’ market timing decisions were 
correlated with fundamental (expected returns) or technical (market advisory service 
recommendations) information.  The results indicate that producers are responding to 
fundamental information in the form of futures spreads that provide expected returns to storage. 
Producers’ decisions were negatively related to market advisory service recommendations.  
Apparently, producers typically make selling decisions that are opposite of those of trend 
followers.  Producers normally sell when prices rise, while trend followers hold when prices rise 
in the hope that they will rise even further.  Since market advisory services have been found to 
be trend followers, their recommendations do not match the marketing decisions made by 
producers.  Therefore, despite survey results showing that producers say they view market 
advisory service recommendations as very important to their marketing decisions, Oklahoma 
wheat producers do not closely follow the recommendations.  It is more likely that producers 
only use market advisory service recommendations as background information, comparing it 
with other information sources in order to make marketing decisions.   
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for Each Elevator 
Descriptive Statistics    South  Central   North 
Average price ($/bu.)           3.41          3.32          3.39 
Average week after harvest           5        16        18 
Percent harvest sales         58 %        19 %        14 % 
Number of observations    14434   7089    6389 
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Table 2.  Regression of Market Information on Wheat Sales for Northern Elevator  
  Estimate t-value   Pr >  t  
Intercept    .4646         3.59   .0003 
1996 crop year        .7137  6.27    < .0001 
1997 crop year      2.9020       20.02    < .0001 
1999 crop year  2.7635       17.83    < .0001 
Nearby Futures Spread (near)   - 2.4808**
a      - 8.69    < .0001 
Distant Futures Spread (dist)   - 2.8721**      - 9.25    < .0001 
Market Advisory Service Recommendation (mas)     - .0579*      - 1.87    .0615 
Weeks after harvest (wah)     - .0965**      - 7.66    < .0001 
Weeks after harvest squared (wah
2)       .0015**        5.45    < .0001 
a One asterisk indicates significance at the 90% level and two asterisks indicates significance at 
the 95% level. 
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Table 3.  Regression of Market Information on Wheat Sales for Central Elevator  
  Estimate t-value   Pr >  t  
Intercept      1.8567       14.41  < .0001 
1996 crop year     - .2420       - 2.29      .0218 
1997 crop year   .4529   2.59      .0095 
1998 crop year        .7074   3.86    .001 
1999 crop year   .3062   1.61      .1080 
Nearby Futures Spread (near)     - .8778**
a       - 3.38      .0007 
Distant Futures Spread (dist)     - .8909**       - 2.80      .0050 
Market Advisory Service Recommendation (mas)        .0203            .87      .3838 
Weeks after harvest (wah)     - .0624**       - 5.95  < .0001 
Weeks after harvest squared (wah
2)      .0008**         3.54      .0004 
a Two asterisks indicates significance at the 95% level.  
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Table 4.  Regression of Market Information on Wheat Sales for Southern Elevator  
  Estimate t-value    Pr >  t  
Intercept      2.9586        9.76    < .0001 
1996 crop year   .0399   .16    .8727 
1997 crop year     1.4263        3.61   .0003 
1998 crop year  .5075        1.20   .2299 
1999 crop year  .5795        1.33   .1840 
Nearby Futures Spread (near)   - 1.7803**
a      - 2.99   .0028 
Distant Futures Spread (dist)    - .3412        - .46   .6461 
Market Advisory Service Recommendation (mas)    - .1372**      - 2.40   .0165 
Weeks after harvest (wah)    - .2910**    - 11.71    < .0001 
Weeks after harvest squared (wah
2)     .0046**        9.21    < .0001 
a Two asterisks indicates significance at the 95% level. 